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v

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The only determinative statute in this matter is the statute of frauds. That provision
provides in relevant part as follows:
The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some note or
memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be charged
with the agreement:
(1) every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within one
year from the making of the agreement. . .
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 25-5-4(1).
ARGUMENT

I.

APPELLANTS HAVE CHALLENGED THE TRIAL COURTS
LEGAL CONCLUSIONS ONLY AND NOT ANY FINDINGS OF
FACT AND THUS HAVE NO DUTY TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE FOR
THIS APPEAL.
Diston asserts that appellants have not properly marshaled the evidence.

(Brief of

Appellee at 12-15.) When challenging findings of fact, an appellant "must marshal all of the
evidence which supports the trial court's findings and show that, in the light most favorable to the
findings, it is against the 'clear weight of the evidence' and is thus clearly erroneous when applied
to the [governing] legal principles.'" Grahn v. Gregory, 800 P.2d 320, 327 (Utah App. 1990)
(quoting Smith v. Linmar Energy Corp., 790 P.2d 1222, 1224 (Utah App. 1990)). See also
Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989). A conclusion of
law, on the other hand, is reviewed without deference and based solely on a correction of error
standard. Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989).

1

In this case, appellants have not challenged the court's findings of fact. This appeal is
limited to purely legal issues based on the trial court's conclusions of law. The trial court's first
conclusion of law was that Ninow "had the apparent authority to enter into the Employment
Agreement with Mr. Diston." (R. 526.) The trial court also concluded that the letter of intent
constituted "a valid agreement between EnviroPak and Mr. Diston." Id. If 3. (See also id. at | 4
"the statute of frauds does not apply; and the [letter of intent] constitutes an enforceable
agreement.")1 As stated plainly in appellant's brief, EnviroPak has challenged the court's legal
conclusions with respect to the issues of agency and whether a valid contract existed. Thus,
Diston's argument as to the marshaling requirement is off the mark.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
LETTER OF INTENT WAS A VALID EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT.
A.

The Letter of Intent is Fatally Indefinite with Respect to the Essential
Terms of an Employment Agreement.

"An agreement [that] depends upon the wish, will or pleasure of one of the parties is
unenforceable." De Los Santos v. Great Western Sugar Co., 348 N.W.2d 842, 844 (Neb. 1984).
Mutual assent to the essential terms of an agreement is required before a contract is formed.
Engineering Assoc, v. Irving Place Assoc, 622 P.2d 784, 787 (Utah 1980). Thus, an agreement
that is "subject to the future mutual agreement of the parties . . . [constitutes] a mere expression
of a purpose to make a contract in the future [because], the whole matter [is] contingent on

1

Whether a contract exists is a question of law. John Deere Co. v. A&H Equipment, 241 UTAH ADV. REP. 17, 18
(Utah App. 1994); Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc. v. Quintek, 834 P.2d 582, 583 (Utah App. 1992).

2

further negotiations." Davison v. Robbins, 517 P.2d 1026, 1029 (Utah 1973). See also Vasels v.
LoGuidice, 740 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Utah App. 1987) (contract for sale of land failed to include
property description and was thus unenforceable because of missing essential term).
Whether described as certainty, mutuality of obligation or mutual assent, the point
remains the same -- where critical terms of the agreement are either missing or are subject to
future negotiation, the writing does not "constitute a valid, enforceable contract." Vasels, 740
P.2d at 1377. See also Southland Corporation v. Potter, 760 P.2d 320, 322 (Utah App. 1988)
("when the parties leave material matters so obscure and undefined that the court cannot say
whether the minds of the parties met upon all the essentials or upon what substantial terms they
agreed," there is no enforceable agreement). See also Bunnell v. Bills, 368 P.2d 597 (Utah
1962).2
This court recently repeated this principal of mutual assent in unmistakable terms:
Contractual mutual assent requires assent by all parties to the same thing in the
same sense so that their minds meet as to all the terms. Determining whether the
specific terms omitted were essential to the agreement requires an examination of

2

The court in Neeley v. Banker's Trust Co. of Texas, 757 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1985) (r'hng. denied) fleshed out the
dual nature of the question of the certainty required to form a contract:
On the one hand, the parties' failure to express clearly their bargain undercuts the inference that they
intended their mutual promises to bind them. In that sense the indefiniteness doctrine focuses upon the
formation stage of the contract and involves inquiry into whether the parties meant to contract at all. The
other concern relates to the denouement of the agreement rather than its incipience. It stems from the
practical difficulties of enforcing obscure, imprecise, or otherwise incomplete promises. Although distinct,
the two concerns tend to merge in the formulations courts have fashioned to guide determinations of
indefiniteness questions. Thus, [we have stated] that "a contract is sufficiently definite if a court is able to
determine the respective legal obligations of the parties.

Id. at 627 (quoting Southhampton Co. v. Stinnes Corp., 733 F.2d 1108, 1122 (5th Cir. 1984).

3

the entire agreement and the circumstances under which the agreement was
entered into.
John Deere Co. v. A&H Equipment, 241

UTAH ADV. REP.

17, 19 (quoting Crismon v. Western

Co. of North America, 742 P.2d 1219 (Utah App. 1987) and Cessna Finance Corp. v. Meyer, 575
P.2dl048, 1050 (Utah 1978)).
Where the language of the alleged agreement indicates that negotiations are ongoing, no
contract is formed. See Crismon, 742 P.2d at 1221-22. In Crismon, a key letter one of the
parties sought to enforce as an agreement stated only that a lease would be agreed upon in the
future and that changes would be made prior to a "final agreement." That lack of certainty
prevented the formation of a contract. 742 P.2d at 1222. See also Davison, 517 P.2d at 1028-29
(no contract exists where an essential term is subject to future negotiation). Until the terms of an
agreement "provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an
appropriate remedy," they are not certain enough to form an agreement.
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

RESTATEMENT

§ 33(2).

Diston argues that the letter of intent "addressed all the essential elements and economic
arrangements required in an employment agreement between parties. . . ." (Brief of Appellee at
16.) That assertion is simply not true. With respect to compensation, the letter of intent does
provide an annual salary, but that element is only part of the compensation. The letter is silent
with respect to the car allowance, the bonus pool and the stock option plan. These last three
items were all to be part of the compensation package, according to the letter itself.

4

Compensation is an essential term of an employment agreement, and here it was left partly to
future negotiation.
Diston failed to address the issue of his duties ~ the second essential term of an
employment agreement. There could, of course, not have been any mutual assent to a term that
does not appear in the purported agreement.

Those duties were apparently left to future

negotiation — or unilateral determination by EnviroPak — and that gaping hole alone renders the
letter of intent unenforceable. Because Diston had not promised to do anything, there was no
mutuality of obligation and thus no mutual assent.
The language of the letter demonstrates that it was, at best, an invitation to bargain. The
letter, for example, never promises Diston any stock options; rather, the options were an
encouragement to bargain:
The Company shall provide Employee with stock options as incentive to enter
into an Employment Agreement with the Company. The Company shall also
provide Employee with future stock options as part of the Company incentive
program. These options will be determined by the Company at the time of
employment.
(Letter of Intent, | 3(e)) (emphasis added.)
There is no agreement here. There is no mutual assent as to Diston's duties and no
mutual assent as to his compensation. The difference between a stock option and a "future stock
option" is unclear, but whatever Ninow meant when he wrote this language, he was not

5

committing EnviroPak to anything enforceable. Diston was promised an opportunity to negotiate
and nothing more.3
Diston ignores the statute of frauds and argues that an alleged separate oral agreement
between he and Ninow supplied the omitted terms. Diston also ignores the fact that, at the time
the letter of intent was delivered and its terms allegedly negotiated, Ninow was not yet employed
by EnviroPak, a fact that Diston knew.

(R. 760; FF. 19.) (See Brief of Appellee at 16.)

Therefore, Diston could not have believed that he was negotiating an employment agreement
with EnviroPak.
Diston recognizes that the enforceability of the letter of intent depends, in his words, "on
the relative importance and severability of the matters left to the future and is a question of
degree to be settled by determining whether the terms to be decided in the future are so essential
to the bargain that to enforce the promise strictly according to the settled terms would make the
arrangement unfair." (Brief of Appellee at 17.) Critical terms must be spelled out or there is no
agreement. At an irreducible minimum, an employment agreement must set forth compensation
and duties. The letter of intent provides only a fragment of the compensation package and is

3

The letter of intent does not even constitute an offer. "An offer cannot be accepted so as to form a contract unless
there is sufficient specification of terms so that the obligations involved can be ascertained." K-Line Builders, Inc.
v. First Fed. Savings and Loan Assoc, 677 P.2d 1317, 1320 (Ariz. 1984). This is also the formulation of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 (1982).

6

utterly silent with respect to duties. Diston himself could not even decide what his duties would
be. (R. 639-40, 604.)4
B.

Enforceability of the Letter of Intent Does Not Depend on Whether
Diston and Ninow Believed that it was a Binding Contract.

Diston argues that the letter of intent is an enforceable agreement because he and Ninow
believed that it was. (Brief of Appellee at 18.) This argument reflects an appeal to the subjective
theory of contracts long abandoned in American contract law. A contract must stand on its own
from an objective perspective:
Although the parties may have had and manifested an intention to make a
contract, if the content of their agreement is unduly uncertain and indefinite no
contract is formed. . . . The rule is that an "offer must be so definite as to its
material terms or require such definite terms in the acceptance that the promises
and performances to be rendered by each party are reasonably certain."
J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS, § 2-13, at 43-44 (2d. ed. 1978) (emphasis in original).
Professor Corbin also addressed this issue in very similar language:
A court cannot enforce a contract unless it can determine what it is. It is not
enough that the parties think that they have made a contract; they must have
expressed their intentions in a manner that is capable of understanding. It is not
even enough that they have actually agreed, if their expressions, when interpreted
in the light of accompanying factors and circumstances, are not such that the court
can determine what the terms of that agreement are. Vagueness of expression,
indefmiteness and uncertainty as to any of the essential terms of an agreement,
have often been held to prevent the creation of an enforceable contract.
1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 95, at 394 (1963).

4

Diston testified that he was going to be the director of operations. (R. 639-40.) Then, after looking at the letter
of intent to refresh his memory, he testified that he was going to be the vice president in charge of quality control
and production. (R. 604.)

7

To determine whether a contract exists at all, the court naturally looks first to the four
corners of the document itself to find definite terms. Anesthesiologists Assoc, v. St. Benedict's
Hospital, 852 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah App. 1993); see also Vasels, 740 P.2d at 1377. Therefore,
it does not matter what Diston and Ninow believed about the letter of intent. What matters is
whether the letter of intent itself contains terms sufficiently certain to demonstrate the mutual
assent of the parties.
C.

The Failure of the Letter of Intent to Satisfy the Statute of Frauds
Alone Renders it Unenforceable.

Diston quotes the statute of frauds correctly but then fails to apply it properly to this case.
Any agreement that cannot be performed within one year must be in writing. UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 25-5-4. Diston argues the specific performance exception to the statute, which is triggered
upon part performance by one party to the purported agreement. UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-8.
This is not and never has been a case for specific performance. This has always been an action at
law for breach of an alleged contract. Employment agreements are not candidates for specific
enforcement.5
Distorts citation to Marvin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274, 275 (Utah 1983) does not support his
position. That case holds that partial performance only applies if "the oral contract and its terms
[are] clear and definite. . . . " Id. The issue of partial performance is reached only after it is

5

See, e.g., Delivery Service & Transfer Co. v. Heiner Equipment and Supply Co., 635 P.2d 21 (Utah 1981).

8

determined that the underlying agreement is certain ~ clear and definite enough to ascertain the
obligations of the parties. See K-Line Builders, 611 P.2d at 1320.
In this case, no oral agreement was alleged. Diston instead has claimed that the letter of
intent constitutes the written contract and is sufficient to satisfy the statute. In order for that to be
true, however, it "must contain all the essential terms and provisions of the contract." Birdzell v
Utah Oil Refining Co., 242 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah 1952). See also Machan Hampshire Properties
v. Western Real Estate & Development Co., 779 P.2d 230, 234 (Utah App. 1989).6
Two questions are raised when an alleged agreement is attacked using the statute of
frauds: Whether the contract is by its terms within the statute and, if so, whether there is a
sufficient written memorandum to satisfy the statute. See McKinney v. National Dairy Council,
491 F. Supp 1108 (D. Mass. 1980). In this case, Diston's purported agreement--a three-year
employment contract- is definitely within the statute. UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-4(1).
The only remaining question is the crux of this case—whether the letter of intent contains
the essential elements with sufficient clarity to demonstrate that there was mutual assent. See
Machan Hampshire Properties, 779 P.2d at 234. For example, the plaintiff in McKinney sued
for breach of an alleged agreement to employ him "until his normal retirement date . . . ." 491 F.
Supp. at 1114.

6

Accord, Nay v. Harrison, 299 P.2d 1114, 1118 (Utah 1956) (In order to satisfy the statute of frauds, the
memorandum must identify the parties, the subject matter and "set out the conditions of the transaction with
adequate certainty.") See also Collett v. Goodrich, 231 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1951)("the memorandum must show
what the contract was, and not merely note the fact that some contract was made").

9

The plaintiff attempted to piece together an agreement from several documents. He used
a memo he wrote to the employer stating that, because he was turning sixty, he needed to earn
the ''highest possible [salary] to generate maximum retirement income." Id. at 1115. He used a
response to that memo, denying him a raise and explaining that he need not maximize his salary
at age sixty.

Plaintiff offered a letter from the employer regarding early retirement and

describing the benefits he would receive upon retiring.

Plaintiff also offered an unsigned

document describing his benefits in the event of termination prior to retirement. This document
also correctly stated McKinney's retirement date. Id.
Construing these documents together in its search for a contract, the court could only
conclude that the documents were ambiguous "on the critical term of the contract in question, the
promise . . . to employ [plaintiff] until his normal retirement date."

The evidence was

insufficient to establish this critical term. The alleged agreement thus failed to satisfy the statute
of frauds. Id. at 1116.7
Although Diston's letter of intent is certain as to the length of the alleged employment, its
certainty ends there. The letter of intent says nothing about duties and only partially stipulates
Diston's compensation.

Moreover, the stock option term is expressly left open for future

determination to encourage Diston to enter into an as yet undrafted employment agreement.

7

Because of a choice of law issue, the court applied New York's statute of frauds, N.Y. GEN OBLIG. LAW § 5-701,
which is virtually the same as Utah's. The court's focus was whether the agreement to employ plaintiff until his
normal retirement age could be performed within one year. Because it could not, the statute applied. 491 F. Supp.
at 1114-15.

10

This, he fully expected to do. (R. 634, 640, 760, 645, 614.) His reliance on the letter of intent
was only an afterthought.
Diston cites C. J. Realty, Inv. v. Willey, 758 P.2d 923 (Utah App. 1988) in support of his
argument that an imperfect writing may still satisfy the statute of frauds.

That is correct.

However, Willey clearly explained why it enforced a finder's agreement in the face of a challenge
under the statute of frauds. In that case, "[t]he contract include[d] the critical terms of the
finder's agreement: it identifies the finder, the finder's clients, the property owner who will owe
a commission to the finder if a transaction is closed with any of the finder's clients, and the
commission rate. . . ." Id. at 928 (emphasis added). In other words, the agreement contained the
rights and mutual obligations of the parties.
As Willey indicates, the statute of frauds does not address ambiguity-that is left for
judicial construction. The statute of frauds addresses completeness—the soul of every contract.
Either an agreement governed by the statute is complete on its face, or it is not. The letter of
intent has too many terms left missing—and too much left to negotiate—to be an enforceable
contract.8

8

Diston expends considerable energy arguing that this and other courts have enforced contracts despite ambiguity.
See Brief of Appellee at 21-24. While the letter of intent is certainly rife with ambiguity, that problem of contract
interpretation is only in issue when the document being construed is a contract. The issue in this case is whether a
contract existed at all. In every case in which ambiguity is alleged, the contract will be interpreted and thus
enforced one way or the other. In Anesthesiologists Assoc, 852 P.2d 1030, for example, the court construed a
document that everyone conceded was a contract. The court observed as follows:
In a case like the one before us, where "the document appears to incompletely express the parties'
agreement or . . . is ambiguous in expressing that agreement," the trial court may rely on extrinsic evidence
to determine the intent of the parties with respect to disputed terms.
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Diston also cites Suciu v. AMFAC Distributing Corp., 675 P.2d 1333 (Ariz. App. 1983),
for the proposition that employment contracts "need not detail every condition of the
employment" in order to be valid. This statement of the painfully obvious only begs the question
in this case: whether the letter of intent is certain enough. In Suciu, the employer's testimony
demonstrated that it intended to hire plaintiff for a specific purpose—his job duties and salary
were never in dispute.9 Moreover, Diston fails to mention that the plaintiff in Suciu was actually
fired by the defendant. There was, therefore, never a dispute about whether the plaintiff had been
hired despite the defendant's contention that the oral employment agreement was too indefinite.
Suciu is, once again, not this case. Diston himself could not decide what his position or
duties would be (R. 639-40, 604), and the letter of intent does not specify the full compensation.
The difference between this case and those relied on by Diston is that here there are no terms
with which to form an employment agreement. The letter of intent, which because of the statute
of frauds is the only piece of evidence capable of supporting Diston's claim, does not meet the
certainty test.

Id. at 1036 (quoting Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving Inc. v. Campbell, 733 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989)).
9
Specifically, the court noted as follows:
The testimony of both [defendant] and [plaintiff] shows that [plaintiff] was to facilitate the transition of the
business [as the result of a purchase] from Central Pipe to AMFAC and in so doing to do whatever
AMFAC required of him and for whatever length of time was required. For this he was to receive the
salary which he was already receiving from Central Pipe. This was sufficiently definite
675P.2dat 1338.
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III.

NINOW LACKED APPARENT AUTHORITY TO BIND ENVIROPAK
BECAUSE HE WAS NOT EMPLOYED AT THE TIME HE
DELIVERED THE LETTER OF INTENT AND BECAUSE NEITHER
ENVIROPAK NOR SURGICAL DID ANYTHING TO LEAD DISTON
TO BELIEVE THAT NINOW HAD SUCH AUTHORITY.

Only the acts of the principal can create that variation of agency known as apparent
authority. Zions First National Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Utah 1988).
Apparent authority is not easily created and requires affirmative conduct on the part of the
principal that reaches the third party, causing that person to believe reasonably that the agent may
act for the principal. For example, in City Electric v. Dean Evans Chrysler-Plymouth, 672 P.2d
89 (Utah 1983), the court observed:
Where corporate liability is sought for acts of its agent under apparent authority,
liability is premised upon the corporation's knowledge of and acquiescence in the
conduct of its agent which has led third parties to rely upon the agent's actions. . . .
Nor is the authority of the agent "apparent" merely because it looks so to the
person with whom he deals. It is the principal who must cause third parties to
believe that the agent is clothed with apparent authority. . . . It follows that one
who deals exclusively with an agent has the responsibility to ascertain that
agent's authority despite the agent's representations.
Id. at 90 (citations omitted) (emphasis added), citing Bank of Salt Lake v. Corporation ofPres. of
Ck, etc., 534 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975).10
In this case, Diston dealt exclusively with Ninow until well after the letter of intent was
signed. He first met Todd Crosland, Rockwell Schutjer and other representatives of EnviroPak

10

See also Kinisky v. Archway Motel, Inc., 586 P.2d 502 (Wash. App. 1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY, § 43 (1980); Kuehn v. Kuehn, 642 P.2d 524 (Colo. App. 1981), reh'g denied (1982); Forsyth v. Pendleton,
671 P.2d 358 (Utah 1980); Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74 (Utah 1982); Luddington v. Bodenvest Ltd, 855 P.2d
204, 209 (Utah 1993).
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in October, weeks after he received the letter of intent. (R. 597-98, 594, 627-28.) EnviroPak
thus could not have done anything to lead Diston to believe that Ninow had authority to hire
employees.
A.

Ninow was not yet Employed by EnviroPak when he gave Diston the
Letter of Intent

Much of Diston's argument on the issue of authority centers on the notion that the
president and chief executive officer of any corporation has plenary power to do as he or she
pleases, at least with respect to the hiring of new employees. Regardless of the truth of that
proposition, and its truth is highly questionable, this argument begs the issue. Ninow was not
employed by EnviroPak — or Surgical for that matter - at the time he gave the letter of intent to
Diston. (R. 760, FF. 19.) Ninow's employment was not effective until two weeks later, and
Diston knew this. Id. Therefore, all Diston has attempted in this argument is to smuggle in the
notion of actual or implied authority in place of the court's conclusion that Ninow had apparent
authority. There was never a dispute about any actual authority of Ninow. He had none. (FF.
19.)
B.

Neither Enviropak nor Surgical did Anything to give the Appearance
that Ninow Could hire new Employees on his own.

Diston admitted that he had no contact whatsoever with anyone from EnviroPak until
October 3, 1991, three weeks after he received the letter of intent from Ninow. (R. 597-98, 99,
627-28.) Diston knew that Ninow had prepared the letter of intent himself. (R. 642-642A, 520.)
These facts, coupled with Diston's knowledge that Ninow's own employment did not begin until
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two weeks after Diston received the letter of intent (R. 760, FF. 19), dispose of the apparent
authority argument. Even when Diston finally did meet someone from EnviroPak on October 3,
at a shareholder's meeting, the EnviroPak representatives introduced him there, and at other
meetings, as an employee of Holy Cross Hospital. (R. 753, 674A-75, 851, 679, 637-38; MillsLaRocca Depo. at 20.)
Moreover, and most importantly, no one from EnviroPak, or Surgical, showed any of the
agreements — the organization agreement or Ninow's employment agreement — to Diston.
Ninow did that himself. (R. 597-98, 99, 627-28.) The mere preparation of an agreement not yet
effective cannot possibly be construed as a representation by EnviroPak capable of creating the
impression that Ninow had the authority to hire Diston. There was no reason for EnviroPak to
keep its organization or employment agreement secret, but that is the logical result of the trial
court's conclusion that apparent authority existed merely because Diston saw these documents.
There was no evidence that EnviroPak had contact with Diston. His sole contact was Ninow.
(R. 598, 643.)
Related to the court's conclusion of law that Ninow possessed apparent authority to hire
Diston (R. 526), is the court's conclusion of law that Diston relied reasonably on Ninow's
apparent authority to enter into the letter of intent. Id. This conclusion is clearly wrong.
Because Diston admits to having dealt exclusively with Ninow (R. 598, 643), he was obligated to
ascertain Ninow's authority "despite [Ninow's] representations" that he had authority. Bradshaw
v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 78 (Utah 1982).
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Diston testified that, because he was dealing with the president and chairman of the
board, he did not need to inquire further. (R. 643.) That is not true. Diston knew that he was not
dealing with the president and chairman of the board because Ninow's own employment did not
begin until after Diston received the letter of intent. Diston's obligation was to inquire into
Ninow's authority. He was obligated to observe "irregularities as well as indicia of authority.
Where such irregularities cast reasonable doubt and suspicion as to the apparent authority of a
fiduciary, there comes into being a duty of inquiry as to his authority." Bridgeport Fireman's
Sick and Death Benefit Assoc, v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, 633 F. Supp 516, 522
(D.Utah 1986).
As a matter of law, it is unreasonable for a third party to rely solely on an agent's conduct
or statements of authority when the duty to inquire arises. Deseret Federal, 633 F. Supp. at 522;
see also Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones, 672 P.2d 73, 74 (Utah 1983), cert denied sub nom,
466 U.S. 937 (1983). This duty always exists when one deals exclusively with a purported
agent. Bradshaw, 649 P.2d at 78. Diston failed to fulfill this affirmative obligation.11 Because
Ninow's own employment had not yet begun, it was unreasonable for Diston to rely on the

11

Diston contends that, because EnviroPak was to have some degree of autonomy, with Ninow as its president,
Diston's obligation to ascertain the true extent of Ninow's authority, if any, was discharged. This argument again
misses the point. Had Ninow been employed at the time he delivered the letter of intent the issue here would be the
extent and scope of Ninow's express authority. The case here, however, involves the issue of Ninow's authority
prior to his employment with EnviroPak.
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organization agreement. That leaves Diston with only Ninow's conduct, and that is incapable no
matter how convincing of creating apparent authority.12
RESPONSE TO CROSS-APPEAL
Diston has cross-appealed on two issues, namely, whether the trial court erred in limiting
the damages awarded to Diston to the period during which EnviroPak was in business and
whether the trial court erred in refusing to award damages for an alleged automobile allowance
offered to Diston in the letter of intent. These issues are addressed in turn.

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN CONCLUDING THAT
ANY DAMAGES TO WHICH DISTON IS ENTITLED ARE LIMITED
TO THE TIME DURING WHICH ENVIROPAK WAS IN BUSINESS

Ordinarily, "stockholders of a corporation are not liable, as such, for any obligations of
the corporation regardless of how they were incurred. . . ." Parker v Telegift Int'l, Inc , 505 P.2d
301, 302 (Utah 1973). See also Salt Lake City Corp v James Constructors, Inc , 761 P.2d 42,
46 (Utah App. 1988) ("ordinarily, a corporation is regarded as a separate and distinct legal entity
from its stockholders.") (quoting Dockstader v Walker, 510 P.2d 526, 528 (Utah 1973)). This

12

With respect to the issue of apparent authority, the court's finding of fact no 33 is particularly curious and
proposes a non-sequitur The court found as follows "Because of the acts of EnviroPak and [Surgical] in drafting
the organization agreement, employment agreement and issuing the press release, Mr Ninow believed he had the
authority to execute the letter of intent Under the circumstances of this case, it was reasonable for Mr Diston to
rely on Mr Ninow's authority " (R 522 ) When apparent authority is at issue, it does not matter at all what the
purported agent believes about his or her own authority The issue is whether the principal has engaged in conduct
that reasonably leads a third party to believe that the agent has authority to perform certain acts on the principal's
behalf It does not matter what Ninow reasonably believed Moreover, there was never any evidence that Diston
even saw the press release referred to in this finding of fact
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same protection applies in the parent-subsidiary relationship. See Salt Lake City Corp., 761 P.2d
at 46-47 (Utah App. 1988).
That distinction between an owner and a corporation will be disregarded, however, when
there is a "unity of interest and ownership [such] that the separate personalities of the corporation
and the [owner] no longer exist and (2) the observance of the corporate form would sanction a
fraud, promote injustice, or an inequitable result would follow." Id. at 47. Once the corporate
veil is pierced, the shareholder is liable only to the same extent as the corporation. See, e.g.,
Transamerica Cash Reserve v. Dixie Power, 789 P.2d 24, 26 (Utah App. 1990).
In this case, the trial court pierced EnviroPak's corporate veil and held Surgical liable for
the breach of contract. Diston argues, however, that the trial court erred when it cut off the
damages awarded under the letter of intent as of the time EnviroPak ceased doing business.
(Brief of Appellee at 28-31.) Diston cites Chatterly v. Omnico, Inc., 485 P.2d 667 (Utah 1971)
to support this position. Chatterly says no such thing. Instead, Chatterly is merely an example
of the general rule that, once the corporate veil is pierced, the parent corporation is liable to the
same extent as its subsidiary.
In Chatterly, employees sued for unpaid wages, and the trial court ignored the distinction
between the subsidiary and the parent and ordered that the parent pay the damages award, in part
because the subsidiary corporation had ceased business and given that the two corporations had
failed to observe their separate corporate identities. The court concluded that an injustice would
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have occurred had the plaintiffs gone without a recovery.

Chatterly says nothing about a

damages award when the employment agreement exceeds the existence of the subsidiary.
Although Chatterly is silent on the issue of whether a contract term that exceeds the life
of the subsidiary obligates the parent, it is clear in this case that it does not. First, Diston agrees
that the liability of the parent is limited by the liability of the subsidiary. (Brief of Appellee at
30.) Second, the trial court expressly found that Surgical did not purposely and prematurely end
EnviroPak's existence - Surgical stood to gain if EnviroPak could be made profitable and indeed
injected substantial capital to keep the company in business. (See R. 527, ^ 9; FF. 44 and 48.)
The precise issue here is whether Diston would have had a cause of action against
EnviroPak based on the remaining term of his contract after the company ceased operations.
Any claim Diston would have brought would have been defeated by the defense of frustration of
purpose. Frustration occurs-thus discharging the obligations under a contract-where "a party's
principal purpose is substantially frustrated without his fault by the occurrence of an event the
non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made . . . ."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 265. See McKinney v. National Dairy Council, 491

F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1980).
In the employment context, that the employer will continue to exist as a viable entity is
just such a basic assumption of the employment contract. In McKinney, for example, the court
observed that, "in the absence of an express or implied agreement to the contrary, if [either the
employee dies or the employer ceases to exist], the period during which the employee must
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perform services and for which the employer must pay terminates." Id. at 1111. Cf. Madreperla
v. Williard Co., 606 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (continued existence of employer defeated
frustration defense).
In Alabama Football, Inc. v. Wright, 452 F. Supp. 182 (N.D. Tex. 1977), affd. without
opinion 607 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1979), plaintiff signed a three-year contract with a professional
football team in the World Football League. After the contract was signed, the league dissolved,
leaving the team unable to play and causing it to fold. The team sued to recover a bonus paid
under the contract, and the player counterclaimed for breach.

The player argued that "the

remaining provisions of the contract have been breached by Alabama in failing to provide a
forum where [he] could perform the agreed services and that such failure is not excused because
Alabama assumed the risk that its football team might fail." Id. at 185.
Alabama countered that "because of financial circumstances beyond its control and for
which it has never assumed the risk the remaining provisions of the contract are impossible to be
performed." Id. The court decided the issue in favor of the team, noting that the failure of the
league, as well as the team, made it impossible for either party to perform under the agreement.
Id.13 The court stated as follows:
Alabama could not have reasonably foreseen such sudden demise of its
team and the World Football League. Finally, it is undisputed that the dissolve of
Alabama's team and [the league] has made performance of the remaining

13

With respect to the risk of failure, including the team's bankruptcy, the court observed that the contract was
silent with respect to "the parties' rights in the event [the team] or [the league] failed, and there is no evidence of
discussion concerning this possibility between the parties at any time." 452 F. Supp. at 186.
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[portions] of the contract impossible. Accordingly, the parties are excused from
further performance in compliance with the contract.
Id.
Wright is consistent with the Utah position on frustration and impossibility. In Castagno
v. Church, 552 P.2d 1282 (Utah 1976), the court described frustration of purpose as follows:
The applicability of this doctrine depends on the total or nearly total
destruction of the purpose for which, in the contemplation of both parties, the
transaction was made. Although performance remains possible, the expected
value of performance to the party seeking to be excused has been destroyed by a
fortuitous event; which supervenes to cause an actual, but not literal, failure of
consideration.
Id. at 1283. Cf. Western Properties v. Southern Utah Aviation, Inc., 776 P.2d 656, 658 (Utah
App. 1989) (city's disapproval of development project rendered performance of development
contract impossible).
When the trial court pierced EnviroPak's corporate veil, it did so to prevent what in the
court's view would have been the injustice of leaving Diston without a recovery. Diston would
have worked for EnviroPak for fourteen months; thus the trial court found that Surgical would be
responsible for the salary he would have earned during that time. Given that the theory of
damages for breach of contract is the lost benefit of the bargain,14 this is the extent of Diston's
recovery. The trial court properly concluded, therefore, that, even though Surgical is liable for

Anesthesiologists Assoc, 852 P.2d at 1036; Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 1982).
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damages for breach of contract, those damages are limited to the fourteen months during which
EnviroPak was in business.15
So long as EnviroPak's demise was legitimate, as the court found that it was--a finding
Diston has not challenged—that would have ended the relationship between EnviroPak and
Diston. In other words, Diston would not have had a claim for breach of contract against
EnviroPak merely because EnviroPak ceased doing business. As a result, Surgical cannot be
held liable for more than EnviroPak would have under the same claim.

V.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DECLINED TO AWARD
DAMAGES IN THE FORM OF A CAR ALLOWANCE BECAUSE
THERE WAS NO ENFORCEABLE AGREEMENT AS TO THE
AMOUNT
A.

The Reference to a car Allowance in the Letter of Intent is
Insufficient and far too Indefinite to Enforce or to form the Basis of
a Damages Award

Whether taken as a whole or broken down to its individual terms, a meeting of the minds-mutual assent—is required before an enforceable agreement is formed. Engineering Associates,
622 P.2d at 787. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33. As already pointed out,

15

Diston correctly states at page 31 of his brief that "[t]he fact that EnviroPak went out of business does not
extinguish its liabilities." No one is arguing that it does. Whatever obligations EnviroPak incurred during the
period of its operation would be the responsibility of Surgical based on the court's conclusion that EnviroPak was
the alter ego of Surgical. However, Diston's apocalyptic conclusion that "[t]o hold otherwise would allow parent
corporations to circumvent and avoid contractual obligations at will is ridiculous. (Brief of Appellee at 31.) Upon a
piercing of the corporate veil, Surgical is as a matter of law liable to Diston for the obligations of EnviroPak
incurred by EnviroPak during its existence. That is a legal result, and one parent corporations cannot possibly avoid
merely by shutting the subsidiary down. The only question is what obligations were incurred by the subsidiary. In
this case, assuming that the letter of intent is an enforceable contract and that Ninow had the proper authority to
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certainty—the element that allows a court to determine the rights and obligations of the parties—is
the most basic prerequisite to the existence of an enforceable contract. Southland Corp , 760
P 2d at 311; John Deere Co ,241 UTAH ADV. REP. at 19.
Under the heading "Compensation," the letter of intent states that, "[t]he Company shall
provide Employee a monthly automobile allowance." That is the extent of the language Diston
contends forms the basis for additional damages for breach. (Brief of Appellee at 33-34.)
Because this undetermined car allowance was purportedly part of Diston's compensation, which
is an essential element of an employment agreement, it must contain enough detail for the court
to determine whether there was mutual assent and to calculate the damages. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 33(2). This vague reference hardly rises to that level and obviously-

assuming that the letter is a contract at all—left the amount of the allowance either entirely up to
EnviroPak or subject to future negotiation. Either way, no agreement on this term was ever
reached.16

bind EnviroPak to its terms, EnviroPak incurred an obligation to Diston for the employment he would have had
during EnviroPak's existence That is the measure of EnviroPak's obligation and thus the measure of Surgical's
16
"If terms and conditions are left to future negotiations, the requisite meeting of the minds is absent and no
contract is formed " Dumas v First Federal Savings and Loan, 654 F 2d 359, 360 (5th Cir 1981) Similarly, when
one of the parties to a purported agreement has the exclusive power to decide the terms of the agreement, there is no
contract because there has been no meeting of the minds De Los Santos, 348 N W 2d at 844, Engineering Assoc ,
622 P 2d at 787 The car allowance is not alone in its uncertainty The purported reference to stock options, which
"will be determined by the company at the time of employment," likewise lacks definiteness These items purport to
be compensation, yet they cannot be determined The trial court was unable to award damages under these terms
because "[insufficient evidence exist[ed] with respect to the terms and calculations of any damages for failure of
stock options and for incentive bonuses " (R 473 ) The trial court observed that "there are too many unknowns
to determine what, if any, value those [stock] options would have had to [Diston] " (R 472 ) This conclusion is
correct, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(2), and is exactly why no contract was ever formed
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B.

Because the Letter of Intent Purports to be for a term of Three Years,
it is Governed by the Statute of Frauds, and any Modification with
Respect to the car Allowance must be in Writing.

Utah law is clear that when an agreement is within the statute of frauds, any modification
of the agreement "must also conform to the statute of frauds." Holt v. Katsanevas, 854 P.2d 575,
579 (Utah App. 1993), citing Allen v. Kingdom 723 P.2d 394, 396-97 (Utah 1986).17 Moreover,
the writing offered to satisfy the statute must be clear and definite.

Machan Hampshire

Properties, 779 P.2d at 234.
In this case, the letter of intent fails the certainty test, and the alleged oral modification as
to the car allowance fails under the statute of frauds.18 This issue does not turn on whether or
not the IRS allows an employer to deduct an employee's car allowance as a business expense.
That argument once again begs the question. It must first be determined whether an agreement
exists obligating the employer to pay an allowance. The letter of intent lacks any certainty on
this point. Moreover, the language regarding the car allowance is consistent with the rest of the
letter: a very general opening to negotiations and an invitation to bargain.

17

The only exception to this is where a party has performed the oral modification . . . ." Holt, 854 P.2d at 580
(quoting Allen, 723 P.2d at 396). This exception does not apply here because Diston never used his vehicle in the
performance of any duties for EnviroPak.
18
In arguing for the car allowance, Diston makes the surprisingly inconsistent statement that the negotiation of
employment compensation "typically involves the payment of more than simply wages, i.e, health insurance,
disability insurance, life insurance, automobile arrangements, 'golden parachute' provisions, retirement
arrangements and expense accounts." (Brief of Appellee at 34.) This is one of the primary reasons why the letter of
intent, which does not specify any of these items, is not a valid contract.
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CONCLUSION
There was no employment contract between EnviroPak and Diston. At best, the letter of
intent was an outline the parties could use to negotiate and then formalize-as Diston expected~a
formal agreement. Neither EnviroPak nor Diston was obligated to do anything based on the
letter of intent.
As for Ninow's authority, Diston had no reason to believe that Ninow could bind
EnviroPak. Neither Ninow's employment agreement nor the EnviroPak organization agreement
were capable of conveying such authority. Diston had no contact with anyone from EnviroPak.
As a result, he could not have relied on anything EnviroPak did or failed to do that could have
led anyone to believe reasonably that Ninow had any authority at all.
As to Diston's cross-appeal, the trial court was correct in limiting Diston's damages to the
period during which EnviroPak was in business. Finally, recognizing that Diston's right to a car
allowance was a matter of contract and not tax law, the trial court was also correct in refusing to
award damages for the unspecified car allowance.
DATED this 2 1

day of July, 1994.
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C.
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2034

ELLEN MAYCOCK
DAVID C. WRIGHT
Attorneys for Appellants

25

/
/

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Reply Brief of
Appellants and Brief of Cross-Appellee to the following, postage prepaid, this C^E^day of
July, 1994:
Neil R. Sabin
Marilynn P. Fineshriber
Nielsen & Senior, P.C.
1100 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

fflctys

26

